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In recent years, high-profile lawsuits involving standards-essential
patents (SEPs) have made headlines in the United States, Europe, and
Asia, leading to a heated public debate regarding the role and impact of
patents covering key interoperability standards. Enforcement agencies
around the world have investigated and prosecuted alleged violations of
competition law and private licensing commitments in connection with
SEPs. Yet, while the debate has focused broadly on standardization and
patents in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector,
commentators have paid little attention to differences among technology
layers within ICT.
This Article uses both existing and new empirical data to show that
patent filing and assertion activity is substantially lower for Internet-
related standards than for standards relating to telecommunications and
other computing technologies. It analyzes historical and social factors
that may have contributed to this divergence focusing on the two princi-
pal Internet standards bodies: the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). It counters the
dominant narrative that standards and SEPs are necessarily fraught with
litigation and thereby necessitate radical systemic change. Instead, it
shows that standards policies that de-emphasize patent monetization have
led to lower levels of disputes and litigation. It concludes by placing re-
cent discussions of patenting and standards within the broader context of
openness in network technologies and urges both industry participants
and policy makers to look to the success of Internet standardization in a
patent-light environment when considering the adoption of new rules and
policies.
t Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and Senior Policy
Fellow, American University Washington College of Law. The author thanks Scott Bradner and
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We reject: kings, presidents and voting.
We believe in: rough consensus and running code.
Dave Clark, 19921
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Standards and Interoperability
Technical interoperability standards are sets of protocols and design
parameters that enable products manufactured by different vendors to
work together with minimal user intervention. These standards are em-
bodied in nearly every electronic and technological device today. Broad-
ly adopted interoperability standards can produce significant efficiency-
]. Dave Clark, Senior Research Scientist, Mass. Inst. Tech, A Cloudy Crystal Ball - Visions
of the Future, Presentation at the Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Internet Engineering Task Force
(July 16, 1992), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
543, slide 19 (Megan Davies et al. eds., 1992), https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/24.pdf.
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enhancing network effects and other benefits and are integral to the mod-
2em technology infrastructure.
Standards may be developed in a variety of settings. Some health,
safety, and environmental standards are developed by governmental
agencies. Most interoperability standards, however, are developed in the
private sector. Individual firms may develop proprietary technologies
that, through broad market adoption, become de facto standards (e.g.,
Adobe's "portable document format" (PDF)). In several well-known
cases competing firms have engaged in commercial "standards wars" to
determine which of their proprietary formats will prevail in the market.
Over the past two decades, however, most interoperability standards
have been developed by groups of market participants that collaborate
within voluntary associations known as standards-development organiza-
tions (SDOs).4 The standards produced within these organizations are
often referred to as "voluntary consensus tandards," as they are devel-
oped through consensus-based collaborative processes, and there is no
requirement that participants use the resulting standards.
B. The Architecture ofInternet Standardization
Gartner Group estimates that more than six billion devices are con-
nected to the Internet in 2016.' The interconnection and communication
of these devices is made possible by hundreds of different standards at
many different technological layers. The TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol/Intemet Protocol) data model provides an abstract representa-
tion of the four functional layers of a computing or communications sys-
tem and is frequently utilized to conceptualize the different technology
layers that comprise the Internet.6 In Table 1 below, the four TCP/IP
layers are shown with a set of exemplary standards as well as the SDOs
responsible for these standards.
2. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 186 (1999); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2025-29 (2007).
3. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 2, at 17 (describing well-known standards wars such as
Betamax v. VHS).
4. The alternative term "standards-setting organization" (SSO) is also used in the literature.
5. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 6.4 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in
2016, up 30 Percent from 2015 (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317.
6. See, e.g., ANDREW G. BLANK, TCP/IP FOUNDATIONS 24 (2004).
7. Id. Table 3, of course, grossly oversimplifies the vast array of standards and SDOs in-
volved in Internet technologies. In addition to the listed SDOs, at every layer there are numerous





4. Application XML (data exchange) W3C, OASIS
HTTP, HTML (web) IETF, W3C
IMAP, POP, MIME IETF
(email)
3. Transport TCP, UDP IETF
2. Internet IPv4, IPv6, ICMP, IETF
ARP
1. Network Ethernet, ISDN, DSL, IEEE
Wi-Fi, X.25 ETSI
3G/4G
As Table 1 illustrates, there are three distinct groups of SDOs in-
volved in Internet standardization at different levels of the network archi-
tecture.8 The first group focuses on Layer 1, which corresponds to physi-
cal transmission and data link technologies.9 These include standards for
both wired connections (e.g., Ethernet, DSL, and ISDN) as well as wire-
less connections (2G/3G/4G). 0 The major SDOs that serve these tech-
nical areas are ETSI and IEEE, though a host of smaller SDOs and trade
associations are also involved in various aspects of this field. Levels 2
and 3 include the "core" Internet protocols TCP and IP." These stand-
ards are maintained by IETF. At the Application layer, IETF is joined by
W3C, primarily responsible for the HTML descriptor language, and
OASIS, which focuses on software interfaces.12
In order for the Internet to operate seamlessly, the standards defin-
ing each of these layers must interface with the layers immediately above
and below it. While this technical compatibility has largely been
achieved in today's many Internet-connected devices, there are striking
differences among the SDOs that operate at the Network,
Transport/Internet and Application levels. One of the largest areas of
divergence among these SDOs relates to their treatment of patents.
8. See generally BLANK, supra note 6, at 24.
9. See id
10. See id at 46-52.
I1. See id at 24-25.
12. Id. at 55-56.
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II. PATENTS AND STANDARDS
A. Standards-Essential Patents
A patent is a form of governmental grant that gives its owner the
exclusive right to practice (i.e., make, use, and sell) a claimed invention
throughout the issuing country.13 Patent protection in most countries lasts
for a period of twenty years from the date a patent application is filed.14
Patents may cover any system, device, product feature, process, or im-
provement so long as it is useful, novel, and not obvious in view of exist-
ing technologies." These basic features of patent law are applicable to
most developed countries through treaties including, most importantly,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).16 In some countries, including the United States, patents are
authorized for the express purpose of promoting innovation and scientific
17progress.
While patents have historically covered new machines, composi-
tions of matter, and industrial processes, patents covering intangible in-
ventions-such as software and methods of doing business-began to
emerge in the last half-century. In the United States, beginning in the
early 1980s, the Supreme Court confirmed the patentability of computer
software programs" (traditionally protected via copyright in the pro-
gramming code itself). By the late 1990s, patents on "business methods"
were also being recognized by the courts.'9 While recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions are believed to have substantially limited the ability to
patent both software and business methods,20 it is estimated that at least
11,000 Internet-related business method patents are still in force in the
United States.2' Outside of the United States, patents on software and
business methods are less common, though they may often be upheld if
13. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
18. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 179-82, 191-93 (1981).
19. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (holding that "transformation of data ... by a machine ... constitutes" patentable subject
matter").
20. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (holding that an intermediat-
ed settlement patent covered an abstract idea and was not patenable subject matter); Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (holding that a risk-hedging patent was not patentable subject
matter); see also Lois D. Mermelstein, Cyberspace-Related Patents Since Alice, 71 BUS. LAW. 343,
34-44 (2015) (describing limitations on software/cyberspace patents since Alice Corp.).
21. MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, GLOBAL INTERNET LAW 785 (2014).
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they are tied to a "technical effect" or other outcome in the bricks and
mortar world.22
The product interface protocols and designs specified by technical
standards are often covered by patents. Most of these patents are owned
23by one or more firms engaged in the standards-development process.
Patents that will always be infringed by a product conforming to a par-
ticular standard are referred to as "standards-essential patents" or
"SEPs." Complex technological products may implement dozens or even
24hundreds of standards -each of which may be covered by hundreds or
thousands of SEPs.25 The result is a very large number of patents cover-
ing different aspects of certain standards.
B. Patent Concerns: The Debate over Hold- Up and Stacking
The existence of patents covering standards is not inherently nega-
tive, and many argue that the availability of patents provides the financial
incentives necessary to fund significant advances in technology. Howev-
er, once a standard is adopted, patents reduce the ability of competitors to
create compatible products and raise prices for consumers.2 6 Patents are
thus two-edged swords when it comes to standardization; they have the
potential to tip the balance of benefits and burdens sharply in favor of
one group or another.
In the recent literature, commentators have observed two scenarios
in which the balance of equities may tip too far in the direction of patent
holders: royalty stacking and patent hold-up. Royalty stacking is a spe-
cies of collective action problem that can occur when multiple SEP hold-
ers each charge a royalty to the manufacturer of a standards-compliant
product. While any given royalty, viewed individually, might be reason-
able and within market norms, the aggregate royalty burden on the prod-
uct, accounting for hundreds or thousands of SEPs, could be excessive.27
22. See Patenting Software, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/softwarepatents fulltext.html (last visited July 23, 2016);
see also Andr6s Guadamuz GonzAlez, The Software Patent Debate, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC.
196 (2006).
23. SDOs typically hold no patent rights in the standards that they produce.
24. See Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Ques-
tions), INT'L TELECOMM. UNION 123 (Dec. 13-15, 2010), http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-
t/opb/proc/T-PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf.
25. See KNUT BLIND ET AL., STUDY ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRs) 34, 36-37 (2011).
26. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 176-78 (2004).
27. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The court in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., observed that
[t]here are at least 92 entities that own 802.11 [standard-essential patents]. If each of the-
se 92 entities sought royalties imilar to [the patent holder's] request of 1.15 % to 1.73 %
of the end-product price, the aggregate royalty to implement the 802.11 Standard, which
is only one feature of the Xbox product, would exceed the total product price.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIO-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, 1 456 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (footnote omitted).
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Royalty stacking could, if not curbed, impose barriers to market entry,
raise prices for consumers, and reduce innovation in product markets.28
Patent hold-up refers to a scenario in which a SEP holder may de-
mand excessive royalties after product manufacturers have made signifi-
cant investments in a standardized technology. Once such investments
have been made, these manufacturers are said to be "locked-in" to the
standard.29 In such cases, the cost of switching from the standardized
technology to an alternative may be prohibitive--dramatically increasing
a patent holder's leverage in any ensuing licensing negotiation and ena-
bling it to charge excessive royalties.3 0
A heated debate is underway regarding whether patent hold-up and
royalty stacking are legitimate threats to standardization and technology
markets, or whether they are mere theoretical possibilities. On one hand,
some argue that there is little empirical evidence of these market failures
in the vibrant and rapidly advancing telecommunications marketplace
where prices continue to fall, product capabilities continue to expand,
and new market entrants continue to appear from all corners of the
globe. ' Others, however, respond that there is substantial empirical evi-
dence for the general theory of hold-up, that its application to SEP mar-
kets is particularly salient, and that evidence of hold-up in these markets
is difficult to obtain primarily due to confidentiality restrictions placed
on licensing agreements by the parties.32 It may also be the case that,
whatever the theoretical risk of patent hold-up and royalty stacking may
be in an unregulated SEP market, affirmative measures already taken by
SDOs and enforcement agencies may have reduced the occurrence of
these behaviors-demonstrating not that hold-up and stacking are not
serious issues, but that they must continue to be policed to prevent future
occurrences.33
C. SDO Patent Policies
Many SDOs have adopted internal policies intended to reduce the
possibility of royalty stacking and patent hold-up. While such policies
28. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 61-62 (2007).
29. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 2, at 11, 116; Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 608 (2007).
30. Farrell et al., supra note 29, at 608; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2049.
31. Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up 2 (Nat'i Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2588169.
32. Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up: Myth or Reality? (Oct. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
33. In this respect, I have analogized the situation to that of Ebola outbreaks in the United
States. As of this writing, there is no evidence of a serious Ebola outbreak in the United States.
However, this does not mean that Ebola is not a threat to the public health (as there is ample evi-
dence of its seriousness from other jurisdictions). Rather the absence of Ebola infection in the United
States is a credit to our public health agencies and healthcare facilities, which have carefully moni-
tored, contained, and addressed potential outbreaks.
861
DENVER LAW REVIEW
existed as early as the 1950s,34 SDO patent policies began to assume
their current forms in the late 1990s prompted by a settlement that Dell
Computer reached with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).15 In
this case, the FTC accused Dell of engaging in unfair methods of compe-
tition by seeking to enforce patents against implementers of a video bus
standard after a Dell engineer had signed a statement certifying that Dell
held no patents essential to the standard. In the settlement reached with
the FTC, Dell agreed not to assert its patent against any third party im-
plementing the standard.36
A second wave of policy revisions occurred in the mid-2000s fol-
lowing litigation involving semiconductor design firm Rambus.3 7 In this
litigation, the FTC accused Rambus of engaging in anticompetitive prac-
tices by concealing, and later seeking to enforce, patents that it otherwise
should have disclosed to an SDO.38 Though Rambus eventually prevailed
on technical grounds,39 the case underscored the importance of drafting
extremely clear and detailed SDO patent policies.
The result is that today almost all SDO patent policies impose one
or both of the following obligations on SDO participants: (1) an obliga-
tion to disclose patents essential to implementation of a standard, (2) an
obligation to license patents essential to implementation of a standard-
either on a royalty-free (RF) basis or on a royalty-bearing basis at rates
that are "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND or RAND).40
Yet within these parameters, major differences exist among SDO
patent policies. These differences can be observed, to a large degree,
when comparing SDOs in the different layers described in Table 1. Thus,
SDOs in the Network Layer, including ETSI, ITU, and IEEE, typically
permit their participants to charge FRAND royalties for SEPs covering
the SDO's standards. The primary Transport/Internet SDO, IETF, per-
34. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 43 (2015).
35. In re Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 623-24 (1996).
36. Id. at 616-26.
37. See generally In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006),
rev d, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (The FTC "f[ound] that Rambus engaged in exclusionary
conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets").
38. Id
39. Though the FTC found that Rambus had engaged in anticompetitive conduct, this decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which held that while Rambus's conduct
may have been questionable, the Commission failed to prove any cognizable antitrust harm resulting
from Rambus's actions. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
40. In addition to constraints on royalty rates, most SDO patent policies contain a number of
additional provisions. RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE,
U.S. NAT'L ACADEMIES SCI. 48-49 (2012),
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga 072197.pdf,
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 27-46 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007); Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1889, 1904-05 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations].
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mits royalties to be charged, but has strong informal norms favoring RF
licensing. And Application-focused SDOs such as W3C and OASIS
largely produce standards subject to RF licensing commitments.4 '
The reasons for these distinctions and what they mean in practice
are explored in the remainder of this Article. For the sake of expediency,
in this Article I will refer to "Internet" standards as the network and
software layer standards that define the Internet and World Wide Web,
because the Network standards published by ETSI, IEEE, and others
have utility in a wide range of applications beyond the Internet (e.g.,
mobile telephony, computer networking, etc.).
III. SEP DISPUTES: IS THE INTERNET DIFFERENT?
A. Patent Acquisition and Standards
Despite the precautionary policy measures taken by many SDOs,
over the past decade voluntary consensus standards have become the
subject of significant private litigation, regulatory enforcement, and poli-
cy debate around the world. As one senior U.S. government official la-
mented in a 2012 address to the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), "The world ... is awash in lawsuits related to patented technolo-
,,42
gies ....
Many recent patent controversies have revolved around the en-
forcement of SEPs against manufacturers and users of standardized
products and the terms on which patent holders may be required to grant
licenses permitting use of their SEPs. For example, in both Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola Mobility, Inc.43 and Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.," the
SEP owner (Motorola) offered to license SEPs covering two widely-
adopted standards at rates that the potential licensees argued were in ex-
cess of reasonable levels and thus in violation of Motorola's FRAND
commitments.45 In both cases, the manufacturers of standards-compliant
products brought breach of contract actions against he SEP owner for
the alleged violation of its FRAND commitments among other things.46
Though there is a natural tendency to paint all technologies in the
information and communications technology (ICT) sector with the same
brush, there are dramatic differences among fields when patents are con-
41. For more detailed comparisons of the terms of different SDO patent policies, see
BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 40, at 13. More detailed comparisons of the terms of different
SDO patent policies can also be found in Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations, supra note 40, at
1894-95.
42. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six "Small" Proposals for SSOs Before
Lunch 9 (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf.
43. No. I 1-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 157525 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012).
44. 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
45. Apple, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157525, at *13-14; Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1054.
46. Apple, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157525, at *4-5; Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1030.
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cerned. Recent studies have shown that, by far, the largest number of
SEPs have been disclosed in the wireless telecommunications area.47 In
2015 Baron and Pohlmann collected more than 200,000 patent disclo-
sures from nineteen major SDOs.48 Of these, nearly 170,000 (84%) dis-
closures were made at the European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI) alone.4 9 In contrast, a total of only 667 patents were dis-
closed as essential to Internet standards developed at IETF.
This discrepancy of three orders of magnitude is notable given that
both ETSI and IETF produce comparable numbers of standards and
count many of the same multinational corporations as participants. It
arises both from the number of patents that are being filed on aspects of
the SDO's technology, as well as the number of patents being disclosed
to the SDO. While studies have shown that a degree of patent over-
declaration exists, particularly at ETSI 5 over-disclosure alone cannot
account for the dramatic difference in declared patents between these two
SDOs. Nor, I suspect, can differences in the inherent complexity of these
two technology categories account for this degree of variation. Thus, in
addition to over-disclosure, higher patenting levels at ETSI could arise
from factors such as the intentional inclusion of optional and non-
essential patented features in ETSI standards (sometimes referred to as
patent 'stuffmg'), 52 more feature-rich standards in general, and greater
granularity in patent claim drafting.53
B. SEP Litigation Today
Similar contrasts between Network and Internet standards emerge
when SEP-related litigation is examined. Table 2 shows all SEP-related
cases that reached judgment in the U.S. federal courts and International
Trade Commission (ITC), as well as courts in Europe and China, as re-
ported by the Essential Patent Blog.54
47. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using Databases of De-
clared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems ofTechnological Classification 9-10 (Regulation &
Econ. Growth Working Paper, 2015), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/BaronPohmannMappingStandards.pdf see
also BLIND ET AL., supra note 25, at Table 3-5.
48. Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 47, at 8, 12.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 10.
51. See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 60-61 (2013) (discussing evidence and literature on over-
disclosure).
52. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the
2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last Four Years,
20-21 (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf.
53. This area is ripe for further empirical study.
54. Beginning in February 2012, the Essential Patent Blog has tracked law and policy devel-
opments relating to standards-essential patents and related issues. ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG,
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). The cases in Table 2 are limited to
those resulting in reported judicial decisions, which represent a small minority of all SEP-related
cases that are brought. See infra Table 2. For a more complete picture of SEP litigation relating to
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Microsoft v. Motorola (2012) W.D. Wash. ITU H.264
(jury) IEEE 802.11
9th Cir.
Apple v. Motorola (2012) W.D. Wis. ETSI UMTS,
N.D. Ill. GPRS
Fed. Cir. IEEE 802.11
Apple v. Samsung (2013) N.D. Cal. (jury) ETSI UMTS
Fed. Cir.
ITC
Golden Bridge v. Apple D. Del. GSMA W-CDMA
(2013) (part of ETSI
UMTS)
In re Innovatio IP Ventures N.D. Ill. IEEE 802.11
(2013)
Wi-LAN v. Apple (2013) E.D. Tex. (jury) ITU CDMA2000
IEEE 802.11
IPCom v. Apple (2014) Germany - ETSI UMTS
Mannheim
NXP v. Blackberry (2014) M.D. Fla. (jury) IEEE 802.11
JEDEC eMMC
InterDigital v. Huawei, ITC ETSI UMTS
Nokia, ZTE, Nokia (2014, D. Del. ETSI LTE
2015) China - Shen- ITU CDMA2000
zhen
Fujitsu v. Tellabs (2014) N.D. Ill. (jury) ITU G.692
LSI v. Realtek (2014) N.D. Cal. (jury) IEEE 802.11
9th Cir.
ITC
seven widely adopted standards (GSM, UMTS, LTE, H.246, 802.11, Bluetooth and USB), see Jorge
L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls - Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, J. COMP. L.
& ECON. (forthcoming 2017). For a census of all FRAND-related litigation brought through 2012,




Ericsson v. D-Link (2014) E.D. Tex. (jury) IEEE 802.11
Fed. Cir.
Rembrandt v. Samsung E.D. Tex (jury) Bluetooth SIG
(2015)
CSIRO v. Cisco (2015) E.D. Tex. IEEE 802.11
Fed. Cir.
Huawei v. ZTE (2015) CJEU ETSI LTE
As Table 2 illustrates, all cases pertained to Network standards, ei-
ther in the field of telecommunications (ETSI and ITU) or computing
(Bluetooth and IEEE's 802.11 Wi-Fi standards).
C. Litigation Involving Internet Standards
Notably absent from the SEP litigation picture described in the pre-
ceding section are network and software standards pertaining to the In-
ternet. To gain a better understanding of how Internet standards are used
in litigation, we compiled all cases in which IETF was requested (either
through formal subpoena or an informal request for a written declaration)
to authenticate the text or publication date of a standards-track document.
These results are presented in Appendix 1.
As shown in Appendix 1, thirty-seven cases involving Internet
standards were identified. They involve U.S. district court litigation as
well as administrative actions before the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) and Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (PTAB).
These data offer a comparison with the telecommunications and
computer networking SEP cases described in Table 1. Several distinc-
tions are immediately apparent. First, unlike the cases in Table 1, which
relate to a small group of heavily litigated standards (802.11 and
2G/3G/4G), the cases in Appendix 1 relate to a wide range of IETF
standards. In fact, other than a handful of fundamental IETF standards
such as Internet Protocol (IP, RFC 791) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP, RFC 1945), there is almost no overlap among the standards rele-
vant to each particular case. This observation suggests that no particular
Internet standard is strongly dominated by patents.
Second, unlike the cases in Table 1, which involve several repeat
players (e.g., Motorola, Apple, InterDigital, Huawei, ZTE), there are
fewer repeat players involved in litigation relating to Internet standards.
This observation may indicate that fewer firms (plaintiffs) in the Internet
space make a business of monetizing patents through the initiation of
serial lawsuits and that the overall field of market participants (defend-
ants) is larger.
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Perhaps the most striking distinction between these two groups of
cases is the role that standards play in them. Thus, in the Network-
focused cases in Table 1, the plaintiff has often asserted one or more
SEPs against manufacturers of standard-compliant products. In some of
the cases, the defendant manufacturer has asserted, as a defense, that the
SEP owner has violated a FRAND commitment to an SDO. But in al-
most all of these cases, there is a direct link between the allegedly in-
fringing product, the standard, and the SEPs. In contrast, in most cases
involving Internet standards, the defendant has simply sought to use dis-
closures and developments at IETF as prior art to invalidate a patent as-
serted by the plaintiff.55 In these cases the standard does not play a major
role in the suit as conceived by the plaintiff and is largely ancillary to the
dispute.
Together, these features of the Internet standards landscape suggest
an environment in which patents, while valuable, play a more modest
role than they do in the Network space. At first blush, the lack of patent
acquisition and litigation surrounding Internet standards is surprising.
After all, nearly every computer, smart phone, and tablet in the world
communicate via the Internet, and the market for Internet-enabled devic-
es is enormous, suggesting that potential verdicts might present lucrative
incentives for litigation. Why, then, have the patenting and litigation
trends observed among Network technologies not affected the Internet?
The remainder of this Article will seek to address this question.
IV. WHAT THE INTERNET Is NOT (YET)5 6
In many respects, the differences in standardization practices be-
tween the Network world and the Internet arise from differences in the
historical development of these two fields. While the layperson may see
no discernable difference between the 4G LTE standard that enables his
or her smart phone to connect to a mobile network and the TCP/IP proto-
cols that define the size and configuration of the data packets that trav-
erse that network, these two technical areas exist across a significant gulf
of history-a gulf that has shaped the policies and norms that character-
ize these industries today.
55. If discussion of a technology occurred at an SDO prior to the applicant's filing of a patent
application, that discussion can constitute prior art potentially anticipating the patented invention and
rendering it unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
56. The title of this section owes a debt to Jonathan Zittrain's influential book The Future of
the Internet and How to Stop It, a cautionary tale about he direction that the Internet could take
under increased regulation. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO
STOP IT (2008).
57. Over a decade ago, Suzanne Scotchmer recognized the fundamental differences between
Internet and telecom standards, even before the most recent wave of SEP-related litigation. See
generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 26. Yet the debate today has lost sight of many of these distinc-
tions.
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Standardization in the telecommunications sector began not as a co-
operative effort among competing firms, but as a (largely successful)
attempt by national telephone monopolies to preserve their control over
the industry. This approach was epitomized by AT&T in the United
States, which operated under the telling slogan "One System, One Poli-
cy, Universal Service."5 8 As described by historian Andrew Russell,
AT&T standardized many aspects of the U.S. telephony system to ensure
that it could obtain a consistent and reliable supply of components from
subcontracted manufacturers and to enable local exchanges to connect to
its long-haul lines thereby avoiding competition in the long distance
market.
Other national operators in Europe and Asia exerted similar levels
of control. In Japan, for example, telecommunications standardization
was largely driven by its century-old national telecommunications mo-
nopoly Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Co. (NTT). For decades, NTT,
with the backing of the Japanese government, designed Japan's tele-
communications infrastructure and supported a dedicated "family" of
equipment manufacturers including Hitachi, Fujitsu, and NEC. 0 The
NTT network was, until recently, characterized by proprietary standards
developed in NTT's research labs and mandated by the national Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) for deployment by NTT's ded-
icated suppliers.61
In most countries, wireless telecommunications were not as heavily
regulated as wireline communications, but scarce spectrum still invited
governmental allocation and control, and standards were adopted at na-
62tional and regional levels. The contest among competing technologies,
often played out by incumbent telecommunications monopolies, fre-
quently involved wrangling over patents. While first generation analog
wireless technologies represented a patchwork of largely incompatible,
vendor-specific technical approaches, by the early 1980s the industry
recognized the need for second-generation (2G) digital wireless tele-
communications standards that would support both voice and data com-
munications.6 3
58. ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY,
AND NETWORKS 97 (2014); TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES 51 (2011).
59. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 99.
60. Kenji E. Kushida, Wireless Bound and Unbound: The Politics Shaping Cellular Markets
in Japan and South Korea, 5 J. IN Fo. TECH. & POL. 231 (2008).
61. Id.
62. Peter F. Cowhey et al., The Peculiar Evolution of 3G Wireless Networks: Institutional
Logic, Politics, and Property Rights, in How REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION?
293-95 (John Zysman & Abraham Newman eds., 2006).
63. See generally RUDI BEKKERS & JAN SMITS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND APPLICATIONS (1999).
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In Europe, Ericsson promoted a 2G standard based on time-division
multiplex access (TDMA) technology, which eventually led to the Euro-
pean Groupe Sp6cial Mobile (GSM) standard. Ironically, the largest
holder of SEPs in GSM technology was Motorola, a United States firm
that conducted significant manufacturing R&D operations in Europe.6 4 A
competing 2G proposal was advanced by a coalition of French and Ger-
man firms, which had strong patent positions in their own technology.6 5
Before this coalition agreed to support GSM at the newly-formed ETSI,
technology covered by some of these patents had to be included in the
standard.66 By the time that GSM was approved by ETSI in 1990, five
firms (Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Motorola, and Alcatel) held broad pa-
67tent coverage of the standard. The situation in the United States was
less fractured, but even more patent-centric, as Qualcomm's code divi-
sion multiplex access (CDMA) technology became the basis for the lead-
ing 2G standard.68 And, as noted above, each successive generation of
wireless telecommunications standards has been burdened with more
patents, opening the way for further disputes and litigation.
V. THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (IETF)
In contrast to telecommunications technologies, the Internet devel-
oped along a path that emphasized patents and patent enforcement far
less. The evolution of the two principal SDOs developing Internet stand-
ards-IETF and W3C-is discussed in this and the following sections.
A. The Origins and Growth ofIETF
The history of IETF is inextricably entwined with the history of the
Internet itself.69 The Internet was initially conceived and funded by the
U.S. Department of Defense through its Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA, also known as ARPA). The project was in-
tended to design a reliable and resilient computer network that did not
rely on the then-dominant circuit-switched technology.70 Building on
64. Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization: The Case of GSM,
26 TELECOMM. POL'Y 171 (2002).
65. Id. at 177.
66. Bjom Lundqvist, Standardization Under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws 59
(2014).
67. Bekkers, supra note 64, at 179.
68. LUINDQVIST, supra note 66, at 59.
69. The origins of the world's biggest network have been documented many times. See, e.g.,
LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2 (2014); KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996);
RUSSELL, supra note 58, at ch. 8; STEPHEN SEGALIER, NERDS 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET (1998); WU, supra note 58.
70. Paul Baran at the Rand Corporation was one of the early theorists of distributed compu-
ting. He believed that a distributed network was more likely to survive a nuclear attack than a net-
work dependent on end-to-end switching, as the then-existing AT&T network was. See Memoran-
dum from Paul Baran, prepared for the United States Air Force Rand Project: On Distributed Com-
munications: I. Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks i, v (Aug. 1964),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchmemoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf ("[Th[is]
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theoretical work done at MIT and the Rand Corporation in the early
1960s, host computers at UCLA, Stanford, UC Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah were connected in 1969 to form a prototype packet-
switched network known as ARPANET. In 1973, Robert Kahn at
DARPA and Vint Cerf at Stanford developed the TCP/IP protocols to
enable ARPANET to connect with other computer networks, thereby
laying the groundwork for the modem Internet.71 As personal computers,
workstations, and local area networks proliferated in the 1980s, the In-
ternet expanded in size and popularity.
Prior to 1985, technical work relating to the Internet was carried out
in a series of task forces chaired by leading researchers at DARPA and a
few universities. In 1985, this activity was placed under the umbrella of a
new, loosely organized organization called the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF). Around this time, Kahn and other leaders of the Internet
project left DARPA, leaving IETF and its sister organization, the Internet
Activities Board (now the Internet Architecture Board) (IAB), to chart
the future direction of the Internet. One of the over-arching features of all
of these organizations was a distinctly non-commercial culture that val-
ued technical capability over than economic returns.72
As the Internet grew in popularity and usage, commercial users rap-
idly began to outnumber earlier academic and government users.73 In
order to create an organization in which commercial, academic, and gov-
ernment representatives could collaborate, a non-profit corporation called
the Internet Society (ISOC) was formed in 1992.74 ISOC became the
memorandum is directed toward examining the use of redundancy as one means of building commu-
nications systems to withstand heavy enemy attacks."]; see also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 69.
Some recent commentators have questioned whether nuclear survival was the driving force behind
ARPANET, arguing instead that developing remote time sharing capability was the primary motiva-
tion for DARPA's interest in distributed computing. See, e.g., Ian Peters, The Beginnings of the
Internet, NET HISTORY,
http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of/`2Othe%20Internet/beginnings.html (last visited July 23,
2016).
71. The original TCP Protocol was published in December 1974 as RFC 675, and the Internet
Protocol (IP) was published in 1981 as RFC 791. The IETF document series extends back to an
academic Request for Comments (RFC) published in 1968. The term RFC has in recent years lost its
meaning as "Request for Comments" and now simply refers to the definitive standards and reference
document series published by IETF. See DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 71-72.
72. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1257, 1268 (1998) (discussing non-commercial norms of Internet community); Jeffrey V. Nickerson
& Michael zur Muehlen, The Ecology of Standards Processes: Insights from Internet Standard
Making, 30 MIS Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 467, 469 (2006) ("The founders of the Internet consciously
resisted marketplace pressures, establishing a protected niche in which they could pursue their re-
search. In this way, the Internet is unusual. Most modem inventions occur within a commercial
context. The Internet, funded by the government and sheltered in research and evelopment labs for
decades, created a broad following interested in both its technical and its social characteristics well
before commercial interests sensed its importance." (citation omitted)).
73. See Mother of Consensus, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/intemational/21693920-engineering-internet-too-big-task-one-
outfit-mother-consensus.
74. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 70.
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"organizational home" of IETF in 1996 and still provides administrative,
personnel, and financial support to IETF.
Participation in IETF is, and always has been, on an individual basis
even though firms often sponsor attendance and participation by their
employees. In recent years, at any given time, over a hundred different
working groups are operational within IETF,76 and between 1200 and
1500 individuals regularly attend IETF's meetings held three times per
year.77 IETF is famously open and transparent.78 Almost all proceedings,
documents, and records are freely available on the IETF web site, and
anyone who is interested may join a technical working group. Docu-
ments that advance through the "standards track" are based on open con-
sensus processes overseen and managed by a group of semi-elected Area
Directors and other leaders. The IETF standardization process is largely
"bottom-up," in which technical proposals are generated by individual
participants who must defend and advocate their proposals both in writ-
ten e-mail communications and at in-person IETF meetings.
While IETF's open culture and transparent procedures have been
79praised by commentators, they have also shown weaknesses. Most no-
tably, the speed of standardization at IETF has flagged, and the organiza-
tion has become notorious for lengthy technical debates and delays.80 As
discussed below, this slowdown contributed to Tim Berners-Lee's for-
mation of W3C as an independent organization in 1994.
B. Patents at IETF
1. Evolution of the IETF Patent Policy
As described above, the pioneers of the Internet were employed
primarily by the U.S. government, its academic collaborators, and a
small number of private contractors (e.g., the Cambridge-based Bolt
Beranek and Newman (BBN)), leading to a distinctly non-commercial
75. Memorandum from Eric Huizer, Chief Tech. Officer, SURFnet ExpertiseCentrum, on
IETF-ISOC Relationship (Oct. 1996), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc203 1.
76. The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF TRUST,
http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2012).
77. Jorge L. Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan,
Korea and China, 30 TELECOMM. POL'Y 916 (2014).
78. Richard S. Whitt, A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a Three-Dimensional Public
Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 689, 702-03 (2013); A.
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116
HARV. L. REV. 749, 787 (2003); LARRY LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
79. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 78, at 702-03; Whitt, supra note 78, at 722; Dieter Ernst,
America's Voluntary Standards System - A "Best Practice" Model for Innovation Policy? 16-18
(East-West Center Working Papers, Econs. Series No. 128, Feb. 2012).
80. See, e.g., Timothy Simcoe, Delay and dejure Standardization: Exploring the Slowdown
in Internet Standards Development, in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 261, 268-70 (Shane Green-
stein & Victor Stango eds., 2006); Nickerson & zur Muehlen, supra note 72, at
479-80.
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culture. Large firms such as IBM and AT&T, which were heavily in-
vested in patenting activity, were not part of the early Internet.82 In the
days before the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,83 which provided a framework
for patenting federally funded inventions, universities and federal agen-
cies engaged in little patenting activity. The combination of these factors
resulted in few patents being filed on the fundamental protocols that de-
fined the Internet.84
The IETF's first formal patent policy was adopted in 1992 as RFC
1310 to accommodate the needs of the growing community of commer-
cial Internet users.85 This policy, largely mirroring the language of the
American National Standards Institute's (ANSI) patent policy,86 con-
tained a rudimentary FRAND or RF licensing requirement. The policy
was strengthened in 1994 with the publication of RFC 1602.87 This ver-
sion of the policy required that patent holders grant a RF license to ISOC
and commit to license implementers of IETF standards on RF or RAND
terms.
Despite these policy enactments, patents did not play much of a role
in deliberations at IETF until 1995 when Motorola disclosed patents
claiming features of the PPP Compression Control Protocol (CCP, RFC
1962) and Encryption Control Protocol (ECP, RFC 1968). Motorola
initially refused to commit to license these patents to users of the PPP
standards, leading to significant opposition within the IETF working
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 218, 241-43 (describing tension between IBM-
backed OSI networking standard and early Internet proponents).
83. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§§ 200-01, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2012)). The Bayh-Dole Act
both authorized and encouraged universities and other government contractors to patent inventions
funded by federal agencies. Id Prior to the Act, there was no uniform federal policy regarding pa-
tenting of federally-funded inventions, and most of the inventions were not patented. Id.
84. See Daniel J. Weitzner, Standards, Patents and Dynamics of Innovation on the World
Wide Web, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Nov. 2004), https://www.w3.org/2004/10/patents-
standards-innovation.html.
85. Memorandum from A. Lyman Chapin, Chair, Internet Activities Bd., on Internet Stand-
ards Process, RFC 1310, at 1-3 (Mar. 1992), https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfcl310.txt.pdf;
see Simcoe, supra note 80, at 260, 270-72 (describing increased commercial involvement in IETF
and Internet standardization).
86. Though ANSI is not itself an SDO, it accredits U.S. SDOs as developers of American
National Standards. See ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, at 10-11 (AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. 2015). Among
ANSI's requirements for accredited SDOs, which are embodied in its Due Process Requirements for
American National Standards, are rules regarding the way that accredited SDOs must handle patents
held by their participants. Id.
87. Memorandum from Christian Huitema, IAB Chairman, & Phill Gross, IESG Chairman,
on Internet Standards Process, RFC 1602, § 5.6, at 31-34 (Revision 2 Mar. 1994), https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc I 602.txt.pdf.
88. Simcoe, supra note 80, at 271-72. One earlier patent disclosure at IETF was made in 1993
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) relating to a patent covering its Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm. See Reported Statement from NIST Regarding Use of DSA, IETF
DATATRACKER (Jul. 23, 1993), https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/449/. However, NIST committed to
license the patent to users worldwide on a royalty-free basis, eliminating any serious concern. Id.
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group,89 IETF eventually published the PPP standards with the patented
technology, but only after Motorola agreed to offer implementers of the
standard licenses on RAND terms.9
The PPP incident led IETF to review and revise its patent policy as
part of a 1996 overhaul of its standardization procedures (RFC 2026).
The IETF's 1996 policy departs from its earlier RAND/RF licensing
commitment by requiring only that participants disclose the existence of
patents covering IETF standards, but not that they license these patents
on any particular terms. IETF's current policy (contained in RFC 3979
and subsequent addenda, collectively known as Best Common Practice
(BCP) 79) preserves this disclosure-only approach.9'
2. IETF's Preference for RF
Given IETF participants' discomfort with Motorola's RAND licens-
ing proposal for PPP, it may seem curious that IETF elected to adopt a
policy with no licensing commitment at all. That is, IETF's 1992 policy
at least contained an upper bound on royalties charged by participants
(reasonableness), whereas the 1996 policy gives SEP holders carte
blanche to charge anything they wish, or even to withhold licenses en-
tirely.
But the seeming flexibility under this policy is, in practice, an illu-
sion. Rather than empower SEP holders to charge high or unreasonable
royalties for their patents, it actually discourages them from charging
anything at all. How? If an SDO policy expressly permits a SEP holder
to charge RAND royalties, then such royalties are effectively condoned
by the organization. But if a policy neither permits nor prohibits royal-
ties, then all decisions regarding royalty-bearing technologies will be
made by working groups. As such, IETF continues to exhibit a strong
preference for royalty-free standards. It does so in two ways: (a) through
express statements of preference in BCP 79 and elsewhere, and (b)
through working group deliberations.
a. RF Policy Preferences
While IETF does not require its participants to commit to license
their patents on any particular terms, reasonable or otherwise, it does
89. See E-mail Archive for IETF Working Group (Dec. 16-18, 1995),
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/info.ietf/raixEKiWbMc/PK9BQuXjnoJ. It is possible that
Motorola was unwilling to follow the licensing procedure outlined in RFC 1602 out of (a legitimate)
fear that the RF license granted to ISOC would exhaust Motorola's patent rights as to subsequent
users of the standard. This likely defect in the IETF patent policy was corrected in 1996 with the
adoption of RFC 2026.
90. See Memorandum from Frank Kastensholz, FTP Software, Inc., on Internet Best Current
Practice, RFC 1915, at 1-3 (Feb. 1996), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcl9l5.pdf.
91. IETF patent disclosures are published and archived on the IETF website. See Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR), IETF.ORG, www.ietf.org/ipr (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
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express a preference for RF standards in many contexts. For example,
Section 8 of RFC 3979 explains that
In general, IETF working groups prefer technologies with no known
[patent] claims or, for technologies with claims against them, an offer
of royalty-free licensing. But IETF working groups have the discre-
tion to adopt technology with a commitment of fair and non-
discriminatory terms, or even with no licensing commitment, if they
feel that this technology is superior enough to alternatives with fewer
[patent] claims or free licensing to outweigh the potential cost of the
licenses.
Thus, the preference for oyalty-free standards at IETF is just that: a
preference-and one that is not universally shared. However, the express
statement of that preference is telling.
Additional evidence of the IETF community's preference for RF is
displayed in connection with specific technology areas such as Internet
security. In these areas, which are viewed as critical for Internet integrity,
the institutional preference for royalty-free standards is articulated more
strongly:
An IETF consensus has developed that no mandatory-to-implement
security technology can be specified in an IETF specification unless
it has no known [patent] claims against it or a royalty-free license is
available to implementers of the specification unless there is a very
good reason to do so.
Thus, while IETF lacks strict positive rules requiring royalty-free
standards, these statements are reflective of broadly held community
norms. Accordingly, while room is left for IETF to adopt an Internet
security standard that is subject to royalties if "there is a very good rea-
son to do so," it does not appear that such a reason has ever been found.
b. Working Group Deliberations
IETF working groups are charged with considering and evaluating
the implications of patent burdens on technologies being considered for
standardization. RFC 3669, which offers guidance to IETF working
groups, provides that
every working group.. . . needs to take IPR seriously, and consider
the needs of the Internet community and the public at large, including
possible future implementers and users who will not have participat-
ed in the working group process when the standardization is taking
place.92
92. Memorandum from Scott Brim, Cisco Sys., Inc., on Guidelines for Working Groups on
Intellectual Property Issues, RFC 3669, § 5, at 8 (Feb. 2004), https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc3669.txt.pdf.
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In addition to statements of preference in IETF policy documents,
IETF participants and working groups exhibit their own preferences for
RF standards in the selection of technical proposals for standardization.
The fact that patents must be disclosed to IETF early in the standardiza-
tion process enables participants to evaluate the extent to which patented
technologies may be essential to draft standards under consideration. If
the members of a working group do not wish to include a patented tech-
nology in the standard, they have the opportunity to redesign the standard
to avoid the relevant patents.
Thus, while explicit group negotiation of patent royalty rates is dis-
couraged,93 working group members are advised to consider the potential
impact of disclosed patents and proposed licensing terms on the useful-
ness of a technology under consideration for standardization.94 In prac-
tice, IETF working group participants have exhibited a keen awareness
of which technical proposals are burdened by potential patent royalties
and take this information into account when designing standards.95
c. Voluntary Licensing Disclosures
Decisions regarding the inclusion of patented technologies in IETF
standards are facilitated by voluntary disclosures that SEP holders may
make regarding their licensing intentions. Thus, while patent disclosures
at IETF must contain certain key information such as patent numbers,
affected standards, and the like, IETF also permits the disclosure of addi-
tional relevant information regarding patents. Accordingly, many IETF
participants make express licensing commitments in their patent disclo-
sures.96 These can include commitments to license the disclosed SEPs on
RAND or RF terms as well as broad commitments not to assert patents in
particular contexts.
Not surprisingly, given IETF's stated preferences, many voluntary
licensing commitments indicate that RF licensing of SEPs will be of-
fered. In a study covering the period between 2007-2010, I analyzed 481
patent disclosures made at IETF covering a total of 594 different stand-
93. Potential antitrust concerns arise in the context of such group negotiations. Non-lawyer
IETF working group leaders do a good job of curbing these discussions. For example, the 2009 e-
mail list discussion of the Robust Header Compression standard, in which a working group leader
writes, in typical tongue-in-cheek IETF fashion, "please do *not* discuss specific patents/patent
claims on the mailinglist [sic], as such a discussion might require a number of contributors tounsub-
scribe [sic] and stop contributing. (It might also cause you or your employer to become liable for
damages in interesting ways.) . . . . If you want to discuss this, meet in a hallway and make sure
nomicrophones [sic] are nearby." See E-mail Archive for Robust Header Compression (ROHC)
(Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/rohc/current/msg05691.
94. See Memorandum from Scott Brim, supra note 92, at 12-13.
95, There are multiple examples of potential patent issues considered by IETF working
groups. See id. § 4 (detailing patent issues arising in connection with standardization efforts for IPS,
PEM and PKI, VRRP and SecSH).
96. The enforceability of such commitments in the absence of a formal contractual framework
is discussed in Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other
Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REv 479.
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ards documents. Of these disclosures, 283 (59%) contained voluntary
commitments to license the disclosed SEPs on royalty-free terms or the
equivalent. These data reveal strong community alignment behind a pa-
tent policy that outwardly disadvantages patent holders.
The strength of IETF's community norms around royalty-free pa-
tent licensing is further exemplified by the agreement-even of IETF
participants with well-known patent monetizing programs-not to assert
their SEPs under certain circumstances.97
IV. THE WORLDWIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (W3C)
A. The Origins of W3C
By the late 1980s, the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN) was a key European Internet node.98 Around 1989 a young
software engineer at CERN named Tim Berners-Lee began work on im-
proving the Internet's user interface to facilitate scientific collaboration
and data exchange both within CERN and with external collaborators. In
doing so he developed the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and hyper-
text markup language (HTML), 99 which became the foundational proto-
cols for the World Wide Web. Berners-Lee, heavily influenced by the
open source software movement, released his code online in 1991.
The graphically oriented World Wide Web was a significant im-
provement over existing text and directory-based file sharing systems
such as Gopher and FTP. Enthusiasm for the Web grew rapidly among
academic researchers. Berners-Lee, aware that researchers were likely to
tinker with and improve his original Web protocols, recognized the need
to standardize the technology to avoid fragmentation and proliferation of
incompatible versions. His first efforts at publishing the Web protocols
as standards were made at IETF.o'0 He was discouraged, however, by the
slow and contentious deliberations at IETF and decided that the Web
would best be served by a new and more flexible standardization body.102
97. See QUALCOMM Incorporated's Statement About IPR Related to RFC 6330, IETF
DATATRACKER (Mar. 19, 2015), https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2554/. Qualcomm committed to not
assert SEPs against implementers of IETF RFC 6330 so long as the standard was not implemented in
a device that uses a wireless wide-area standard (e.g., a mobile phone).
98. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 74.
99. Memorandum from Tim Bemers-Lee, Dir., W3 Consortium, & Daniel Connolly, Re-
search Tech. Staff, W3 Consortium, on Hypertext Markup Language - 2.0, RFC 1866, § 1.1, at 1, 3
(Nov. 1995), https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcl866.txt. ("HTML is an application of ISO Standard
8879: 1986 Information Processing Text and Office Systems; Standard Generalized Markup Lan-
guage (SGML).").
100. Andrew L. Russell, Constructing Legitimacy. The W3C's Patent Policy, in OPENING
STANDARDS 159, 162-64 (Laura DeNardis ed., 2011).
101. Bemers-Lee submitted a version of HTML for standardization to IETF in June 1993. See
Memorandum from Tim Bemers-Lee & Daniel Connolly, supra note 99. The standard was pub-
lished by IETF as RFC 1866 in November 1995. Id.
102. Russell, supra note 100, at 163-64. It has also been alleged that Bemers-Lee preferred a
standardization process over which he exerted more direct control. In this regard, W3C has been
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In 1994 Berners-Lee left CERN for MIT, which became the home of a
new SDO devoted to Web standards-the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C). Berners-Lee brought the page descriptor language HTML to
W3C, while leaving HTTP at IETF, where it continues to be maintained.
Soon after MIT became the base for W3C, several other universities
in Europe and Asia joined W3C as organizational hosts. W3C received
early funding from DARPA and the European Union but soon shifted to
a self-sufficient member fee funding model.10 3
B. Patents and W3C
1. The Increasing Relevance of Patents to the Web
The open source movement was, to a large extent, a reaction to in-
creases in intellectual property protection for computer software. As not-
ed above, by the late 1980s and 1990s, an increasing number of software-
related patents were being issued in the United States. In addition, pa-
tents purporting to cover broad categories of Internet technology, includ-
ing British Telecom's 1989 patent that allegedly covered all hyper-
links, drew increasing press coverage and public oncern, along with a
degree of scorn and ridicule from the technical community.'0 5 According
to Richard Stallman, one of the founders of the "free" software move-
ment, "the worst threat we face comes from software patents."'0
In 1993, the University of Minnesota, which developed the popular
Gopher Internet file sharing system, announced that it would begin to
charge commercial users to use Gopher.'07 This announcement caused
concern among many Internet users and prompted Berners-Lee to seek
assurances from his own employer (CERN) that it would not do the
same.1os Later that year, CERN agreed to contribute its intellectual prop-
erty rights in the code underlying the Web to the public domain to "fur-
referred to as a "benevolent dictatorship," one in which the ultimate authority lies in the organiza-
tion's director. See TINKEKE M. EGYEDI, BEYOND CONSORTIA, BEYOND STANDARDISATION?: NEW






103. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 74-75.
104. See British Telecomms. PLC v. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106-07
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
105. See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Patently Ridiculous Claims, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2001, at E-1;
BT Pushes Hyperlink Patent, GEEK (Dec. 15, 2000, 1:55 PM), http://www.geek.com/news/bt-
pushes-hyperlink-patent-542562/15 ("If BT keeps pushing this 'we own hyperlinks' nonsense it's
going to take an image beating without precedent . . . .").
106. Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in OPEN
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 53, 67 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999);
see also Weitzner, supra note 84, at Part 11.
107. Russell, supra note 100, at 162.
108. Id.
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ther compatibility, common practices, and standards in networking and
computer supported collaboration."',
09
Given W3C's origins in the scientific research community, the first
five years of its existence were relatively free from patent-related contro-
versy. As Berners-Lee observed of that period:
Many participants in the original development of the Web knew that
they might have sought patents on the work they contributed to W3C,
and that they might have tried to secure exclusive access to these in-
novations or charge licensing fees for their use. However, those who
contributed to building the Web in its first decade made the business
decision that they, and the entire world, would benefit most by con-
tributing to standards that could be implemented ubiquitously, with-
out royalty payments.no
However, as noted in the Introduction, throughout the 1990s patents
were becoming an increasingly important force in the commercial world.
Patent concerns finally reached W3C in 1999. That year, Microsoft and
Sun Microsystems disclosed patents covering W3C's CSS and XLink
technical proposals, respectively, and a small firm called Intermind ob-
tained a patent claiming key aspects of W3C's Platform for Privacy Pref-
erences (P3P) standard."' W3C feared that Intermind's royalty demands
would chill adoption of the P3P standard. As a result, W3C engaged the
prestigious New York law firm Pennie & Edmonds to opine that P3P did
not infringe Intermind's patent. Eventually, Intermind backed down and
P3P was released without the threat of patent infringement. Nevertheless,
the Intermind incident caused W3C to re-evaluate its informal "gentle-
men's agreement" whereby participants would not seek to patent W3C
standards.
2. W3C's Royalty-Free Patent Policy
In 1999 W3C began the arduous task of developing a formal patent
policy. Daniel Weitzner, one of the organization's early leaders, offers a
detailed account of this difficult and contentious multi-year process.1 12
The first policy that W3C's drafting group developed included require-
ments relating both to patent disclosure and patent licensing. The patent
licensing provisions were the most controversial because they would
have required W3C members to license SEPs to all implementers of
109. W. Hoogland, Dir. Research, & H. Weber, Dir. Admin., Declaration at the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) Concerning CERN W3 Software Release into Public
Domain 2 (Apr. 30, 1993), https://tenyears-www.web.cem.ch/tenyears-
www/Declaration/Page2.html.
110. Tim Bemers-Lee, Director's Decision, W3C Patent Policy, W3C (May 20, 2003, 7:50
AM), https://www.w3.org/2003/05/12-director-patent-decision-public.html.
111. See Russell, supra note 101, at 165-66; Weitzner, supra note 84, Parts II-IV.
112. Weitzner, supra note 84, Section III.A.
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W3C standards on royalty-free or royalty-bearing RAND terms.' The
possibility that monetary royalties could be charged on W3C standards
alarmed some W3C participants and members of the public particularly
the Open Source Initiative (OSI) and other open source software devel-
opers and advocates."14 They claimed that large corporate interests within
W3C were attempting to "hijack" the organization and subvert its histor-
ically open tradition. W3C received nearly 2,500 public comments on the
draft policy, most of which opposed it." 5
This reaction from the open source community sent W3C back to
the drawing board. In 2002, after extensive internal discussions and de-
bate, W3C proposed a new patent policy, this time requiring royalty-free
licensing by all members of the working group that developed a standard.
Berners-Lee justified the move to a royalty-free model as follows:
The open platform of royalty-free standards enabled software com-
panies to profit by selling new products with powerful features, ena-
bled e-commerce companies to profit from services that on this foun-
dation, and brought social benefits in the non-commercial realm be-
yond simple economic valuation. By adopting this Patent Policy with
its commitment to royalty-free standards for the future, we are laying
the foundation for another decade of technical innovation, economic
growth, and social advancement."6
To accommodate the concerns of some of its corporate members,
the W3C included an exception in its policy that allowed the inclusion of
patented technologies in W3C standards, but only after a "Patent Adviso-
ry Group" (PAG) comprising representatives of all working group mem-
bers and the Chair of W3C determined that the patented technology was
essential to the standard and could not be worked around. The new ver-
sion of the patent policy was approved and went into effect in 2004, the
tenth anniversary of the W3C's formation. The policy remains in effect
today with only minor revisions.
The new W3C patent policy was not universally applauded by W3C
members, and it has been reported that the royalty-free requirement
caused large patent holders such as IBM, SAP, and Microsoft to bring
standardization proposals to SDOs with more patent-friendly policies."8
113. Id.; Mark Cutler, W3C Working Group on Patent Policy Weighing Royalties for Patented
Contributions, 2 Computer Tech. L. Rep. (BNA) 446 (2001).
114. E-mail from Brett Serkez, Techie, to OpenSource.org (Nov. 13, 2001),
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-voice/2001 OctDec/0037.html.
115. Nickerson & zur Muehlen, supra note 72, at 477.
116. Bemers-Lee, supra note 110.
117. See W3C Patent Policy, W3C (Feb. 5, 2004), https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-
Policy-20040205/.
118. Paul Festa, W3C Makes Patent Ban Final, CNET (May 22, 2003, 5:13 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/w3c-makes-patent-ban-final/; Russell, supra note 100, at 166-67. SDOs
face the risk that members will depart with any controversial policy change. Such fears arose in 2007
when the small SDO VITA amended its patent policy to require members holding SEPs to disclose
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Nevertheless, some of these firms eventually expressed support for the
policy acknowledging the growing importance of open source software
to the Web ecosystem.
Since the W3C's royalty-free policy went into effect, there have
been relatively few invocations of the PAG process. One of the first
arose in 2003, when a PAG was formed to assess the potential impact of
four patents on W3C's draft VoiceXML standard.119 The PAG ap-
proached the owners of the four patents and received a commitment of
royalty-free licensing with respect to two of them and an assurance that
the owner of the third did not consider the patent to be essential to the
standard. But Rutgers University, the owner of the fourth patent, did not
make any commitment regarding the patent and seemingly reserved its
right to seek royalties against implementers of the standard. The W3C
proceeded to adopt the standard in the face of this threat, and it appears
that Rutgers did not actively seek to license the patent.
A more contentious incident arose, also in 2003, with respect to a
patent held by a small firm called Eolas, which allegedly covered a key
aspect of the HTML standard.120 After Eolas obtained a $521 million
infringement verdict against Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, W3C
convened a PAG to assess the potential impact of the Eolas patent on
HTML.121 As a result of the PAG, W3C petitioned the PTO to re-
examine the Eolas patent. In one letter to the PTO, Berners-Lee potently
expressed the concerns of the PAG and the broader Web community:
The barriers imposed on the information technology industry by the
[Eolas] '906 patent are of such concern because they cause fragmen-
tation in the basic standards that weave the Web together. Denial of
access to any particular technology is a problem that engineers can
successfully address, provided they have knowledge of the barrier be-
fore it becomes part of a standard. However, as the '906 patent
threatens widely deployed, standard technology, the damage is mag-
nified. If the '906 patent remains in force, Web page designers and
software developers will face a dangerous dilemma. They may com-
their maximum royalty rates prior to approval of a standard. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards
and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 193-
94 (2013). Despite vigorous opposition, only one member, Motorola, actually withdrew from VITA
as a result of the policy change. Id. at 193-94. Similar concerns have been raised in the wake of
recent policy amendments by IEEE. See, e.g., Susan Decker & Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won't
Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. I1, 2015, 9:23 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-I l/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-
unfair-may-not-take-part; Ron D. Katznelson, IEEE-USA Comm., Presentation: Will New IEEE
Standards Incorporate Patented Technologies Under the Proposed Patent Policy? 12 (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/sdieee/I 824-1806-SD%2BSection-IEEE-Standards-
Patent/o2BPolicy/2BDec-23-2014v2.pdf (first quoting Letter from Nokia to IEEE (Nov. 18, 2014);
and then quoting Letter from Ericsson to IEEE (November 7, 2014)).
119. W3C, VOICE BROWSER PAG REPORT (2003), http://www.w3.org/2003/06/VBPAG-
Report.html.
120. Weitzner, supra note 84.
121. Id.
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ply with globally-recognized Web standards resulting in an inade-
quate user experience of their content. Or, they may attempt to design
to the various work-arounds chosen by different browser developers
and face the uncertainly of not knowing who will be able to use their
content or applications properly. W3C's development and the indus-
try's acceptance of a single common base of standards for Web infra-
structure arose out of a need to avoid just this sort of dilemma. The
'906 patent is a substantial setback for global interoperability and the
success of the open Web.1
22
The Eolas patent was subsequently invalidated by the PTO on the
basis of the prior art presented by W3C.1 23
Despite these relatively high-profile incidents and the large number
of standards published by W3C, only a handful of PAGs have been
formed to investigate patents not subject to royalty-free licensing com-
mitments. During the first ten years of the royalty-free patent policy, a
mere twelve PAGs were formed, all of which resolved the relevant issues
without serious disruption of W3C's standardization activities. 124 It thus
appears that the RF policy at W3C has largely been a success.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE LOGIC OF ROYALTY-FREE
As this Article shows, the primary SDOs responsible for Internet
standards, IETF and W3C, have evolved strong policies and norms fa-
voring royalty-free standards. Many of the resulting standards have taken
on the character of public goods "free for everyone to use without re-
strictions."l25 This approach has likely contributed to the relatively low
level of patent litigation relating to Internet standards in comparison with
Network standards.
The preference for RF standards at IETF and W3C can be traced, in
part, to the historical origins of these groups in academia and government
and their ties to the open source movement. Suzanne Scotchmer called
the circumstances resulting in the open Internet "one of the most fortu-
nate accidents in industrial history." 26
Today, however, IETF and W3C are dominated by private firms
that are as motivated by profit as their counterparts in the Network space.
Their reasons for favoring RF models are not entirely ideological or al-
truistic. As I have written elsewhere, a range of commercial considera-
tions motivate firms to relinquish potentially profitable exploitation of
122. Letter from Tim Berners-Lee, Dir., World Wide Web Consortium, to Hon. James E.
Rogan, Dir., USPTO (Oct. 28, 2003), http://www.w3.org/2003/10/27-rogan.html (emphasis omit-
ted).
123. Weitzner, supra note 84.
124. W3C Patent and Standards Interest Group: Continued Maintenance of W3C's Patent
Policy, W3C, http://www.w3.org/2004/pp/psig/ (last updated May 3, 2016).
125. Whitt, supra note 78, at 722.
126. SCOTCHMER, supra note 26, at 307.
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their patent rights in the service of broader commercial goals, such as the
seeding of new markets, the establishment of technological leadership,
and the desire to achieve industry-wide interoperability.127
Whatever the reasons for its development, the royalty-free patent
landscape of the Internet has yielded significant benefits. It has enabled
substantial innovation and experimentation, it has yielded entirely new
industries such as social media, and it has facilitated virtually unrestrict-
ed market entry and competition.128 It has also influenced groups devel-
oping other important standards, such as USB (uniform serial bus) and
Bluetooth, to adopt royalty-free licensing requirements.129  Finally,
groups such as IETF and W3C have demonstrated that technical stand-
ards are not incompatible with open source software projects, which con-
tinue to increase in importance.130
Defendants of patent monetization argue that a financial return on
patents is necessary to fuel innovation and product development in com-
plex and rapidly advancing technologies. There is clearly some truth to
this assertion-and a recognition in no less than the U.S. Constitution
that patents are intended to promote innovation. However, proponents of
strongly-monetized patent structures may lose sight of the innovation
that could potentially be enabled by lowering barriers to technology mar-
kets. 131
127. Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 543, 572-73 (2015). See also Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, 1 15 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013) ("Industry participants in the standard-setting process enjoy significant potential bene-
fits to having their technology incorporated into a standard independent of potential royalty income
from licensing patents they own. These non-income benefits can include increased demand for partici-
pants' products, advantages flowing from familiarity with the contributed technology potentially
leading to shorter development lead times, and improved compatibility with proprietary products
using the standard.").
128. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 75-76.






&sig2=7eWxYkJfmL-Or9WyhU0G4Q; USB 3.0 Adopters Agreement,
http://www.usb.org/developers/docs/USB_3_0_AdoptersAgreementFinal_020411 .pdf.
1 30. See Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A Primer on Intellectual Property Policies
of Standards Bodies, in EFFECTIVE STANDARDIZATION MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATE SETTINGS
220-21 (Kai Jakobs ed., 2016).
131. In a way, today's patent monetization justifications echo those made by AT&T in the
heyday of the telephony monopoly. As Tim Wu has described it, AT&T justified its state-sanctioned
monopoly, in part, by arguing that the resulting rents were plowed back into research and develop-
ment at facilities like Bell Laboratories, where no fewer than seven Nobel laureates hung their hats
and to which we owe the transistor and many other technological marvels. Yet in hindsight, Wu
points.out these arguments ring hollow. After all the basic residential telephone unit remained essen-
tially unchanged for forty years notwithstanding the brain trust at Bell Labs. What's more, AT&T
imposed a daunting array of intellectual property, regulatory and commercial barriers to block any
innovator who sought to improve telephony in the slightest degree (culminating in the notorious
"Hush-a-Phone" debacle). When the FCC finally grew skeptical of the monopoly's virtue and or-
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Today's debate over SEPs and patent monetization is really just one
skirmish in a much larger war over openness and closure in technology
networks. Scholars including Larry Lessig,13 2 Jonathan Zittrain,13 3 Milton
Mueller,13 4 Tim Wu,"' and Laura DeNardis1 36 have warned about the
consequences of over-regulating, closing, and monetizing the Internet.
The open and royalty-free nature of the Internet was not pre-ordained
and it may not last forever. Slight changes in history could have sent the
Internet off in very different directions. Just as a single meteor or climat-
ic event can shift the course of biological evolution, so can a single judi-
cial decision or regulatory pronouncement change the course of a tech-
nology field. I doubt that many today would prefer to live in a world in
which most content is meted out by commercial networks, as it was in
the 1980s under pay services like American Online (AOL), Compuserve,
and Prodigy. Could the proliferation of patents on fundamental interop-
erability standards nudge us back in this direction?
Rapid technical change will occur in the near future with the advent
of the Internet of Things, the Smart Grid,137 wearable devices, and other
technological advances, as well as the continuing convergence of compu-
ting, networking and telecommunications technologies.138 Each of these
developments will require new standards and common protocols that
build on top of the existing Internet infrastructure. Let us hope that these
new technologies remain as open to future innovation and competition as
the Internet is today.'39
dered the standardization of telephone jacks via the now-ubiquitous RJ- I1 connector, an explosion
of innovation occurred leading to the introduction of connected devices including fax machines,
answering machines, and speakerphones. WU, supra note 58, at 9, 307-08.
132. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 4 (2006); LESSIG, supra note 78.
133. See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 56, at 246.
134. See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 7-10 (2002).
135. See generally WU, supra note 58, at 317-19.
136. See generally LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014); DENARDIS, supra note 69.
137. For example, I describe the influence of telecommunications and electronics patent hold-
ers on discussions of Smart Grid standardization. Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents and the
National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L. REV. 641, 642-43 (2012).
138. Weitzner observed the influence of telecommunications and computing technology on the
increasing prominence of patents in Internet standards as early as 2004. Weitzner, supra note 84
("[A]s the Web comes into contact with the telecommunications, broadcast media and consumer
electronics industries, there is pressure to change the traditional role patents have played in Web
standards.").
139. A group of SDOs led by IETF. W3C, and IEEE took a tentative step toward formalizing
this ethos in 2012 with the publication of the OpenStand Modern Paradigm for Standards. See
Principles, OPENSTAND, https://open-stand.org/about-us/principles/ (last visited May 30, 2016). The
principles espoused by OpenStand include laudable ideals such as cooperation, due process, trans-
parency, and consensus. Id. The OpenStand position regarding patents, however, does little other
than accept both RF and FRAND licensing models for patented standards.
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APPENDIX 1
PATENT CASES INVOLVING IETF STANDARDS
Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
14014
2003 Cisco Sys., Inc. 1 RFC 2281 - Hot Standby Router
v. Huawei Protocol ("HSRP")
Techs., Co., 266 RFC 3768 - Virtual Router Re-
F. Supp. 2d 551, dundancy Protocol ("VRRP")
552 (E.D. Tex.
2003).
2004 Amended Com- 2 RFC 1866 et seq. - Hypertext
plaint at 6, Markup Language - 2.0 (HTML)
Foundry Net- RFC 2616 - Hypertext Transfer








140. Indicates year in which request for document authentication was made.
141. Indicates the role of IETF standards in the case:
1 - Commercial dispute
2 - Patent holder alleges that standards-compliant products infringe patents
3 - Unknown
4 - Challenge to patent validity/Use of IETF documents to establish patent in-
validity
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Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2005 Complaint at 11, 2 RFC 2002 - IP Mobility Support
Fenner Invest- RFC 2003 - IP Encapsulation
ments, LTD. v. within IP
Juniper Net- RFC 2004 - Minimal Encapsula-
works, Inc., No. tion within 1P
2-05CV-05, RFC 2006 - The Definitions of
2005 WL Managed Objects for
320552 (E.D. IP Mobility Support
Tex. Jan. 6, using SMv2
2005). RFC 2344 - Reverse Tunneling
for Mobile IP
RFC 2794 - Mobile IP Network
Access Identifier
Extension for IPv4
RFC 3012 - Mobile iPv4 Chal-
lenge/Response Extensions
2005 Connectel, LLC 2 RFC 1479 - Inter-Domain Policy
v. Cisco Sys., Routing Protocol
Inc., 391 F. Specification: Ver-
Supp. 2d 526, sion 1
527 (E.D. Tex. RFC 1771 - A Border Gateway
2005). Protocol 4 (BGP-4)
RFC 1772 - Application of the
Border Gateway
Protocol in the In-
ternet
RFC 1773 - Experience with the
BGP-4 protocol
RFC 1774 - BGP-4 Protocol
Analysis
RFC 1775 - To Be "On" the In-
ternet
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494 F. Supp. 2d
34, 49 (D. Mass.
2007).
42007
2008 Alcatel USA Res. 3 Middlebox Communications






RFC 882 - Domain names: Con-
cepts and facilities
RFC 883 - Domain names: Im-
plementation speci-
fication
RFC 973 - Domain system
changes and obser-
vations
RFC 1001 - Protocol standard
for a NetBIOS ser-
vice on a TCP/UDP
transport: Concepts
and methods
RFC 1002 - Protocol standard
for a NetBIOS ser-
vice on a TCP/UDP
transport: Detailed
specifications
RFC 1034 - Domain names -
concepts and facili-
ties
RFC 1035 - Domain names -
implementation and
specification
RFC 1105 - Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)
RFC 1163 - Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)
RFC 1164 - Application of the
Border Gateway
Protocol in the In-
ternet
RFC 1546 - Host Anycasting
Service
RFC 1794 - DNS Support for
Load Balancing
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Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2009 UTStarcom, Inc. 4 Draft proposals re. Virtual Tun-
v. Starent Net- neling Protocol and Tunnel Es-
works, Corp., tablishment Protocol
675 F. Supp. 2d
854, 870 (N.D.
Ill. 2009).
2009 Answer and 4 RFC 2109 - HTTP State Man-
Counterclaims at agement Mechanism
25, Valueclick, RFC 2965 - HTTP State Man-







2009 Brief of Defend- 4 Draft proposals relating to Media
ant at *2-6, Gateway Control Protocol
Voxpath Net- (MGCP), Session Description
works, Inc. v. Protocol (SDP), and Session Ii-
Verizon Bus. tiation Protocol (SI), Telephony
Network Servs. Routing Information Protocol
Inc., No. 4:08- (TRIP), IP Network Address





2009 Amended Coin- 2 RFC 3031 - Multiprotocol Label
plaint & De- Switching Architec-
mand for Jury ture
Trial at 13, 16, RFC 3471 - Generalized Multi-
Cheetah Omni Protocol Label
LLC v. Verizon Switching (GMPLS)
Bus. Network Signaling Function-







Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2012 Apple, Inc. v. 4 RFC 791 - Internet Protocol
Motorola Mobil-




2011 SSL Servs., LLC 3 RFC158-GenericSecurity
v. Citrix Sys., Service Application




2012 VirnetX v. Mitel 2 Large number of documents re-
Networks Corp., lating to L2TP, SSL, SMTP,














2012 Summit Data 4 All documents relating to Inter-
Sys. v. EMC net Small Computer Systems
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140 141
2012 Realtime Data, 4 RFC 1144 - Compressing TCP/IP
LLC v. Thomson Headers for Low-
Reuters Corp., Speed Serial Links
No. 1 1CV06703, RFC 1332 - The PPP Internet
2011 WL Protocol Control
4576896 Protocol (IPCP)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. RFC 1661 - The Point-to-Point
27, 2011). Protocol
RFC 1662 - PPP in HDLC-like
Framing
RFC 1962 - The PPP Compres-
sion Control Proto-
col (CCP)
RFC 2395 - IP Payload Com-
pression Using LZS
RFC 2507 - IP Header Compres-
sion
RFC 2509 - IP Header Compres-
sion over PPP
2012 Alberta Tele- 3 Numerous draft documents relat-



















2012 Innova Patent 2 8 RFCs relating to DomainKeys








RFC 741 - Specifications for
the Network Voice
Protocol (NVP)
RFC 1633 - Integrated Services
in the Internet Ar-
chitecture: an Over-
view
RFC 1190 - Experimental Inter-
net Stream Protocol:
Version 2 (ST-II)
RFC 1889 - RTP: A Transport
Protocol for Real-
Time Applications
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ferences with Min-
imal Control
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tion Protocol
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RFC 2210 - The Use of RSVP
with IETF Integrat-
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4 RFC 977 - Network News
Transfer Protocol
RFC 1738 - Uniform Resource
Locators (URL)
RFC 1941 - Frequently Asked
Questions for
Schools
RFC 1392 - Internet Users' Glos-
sary
RFC 1630 - Universal Resource
Identifiers in
WWW: A Unifying
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work as used in the
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RFC 2806 - URLs for Telephone
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2013 Brixham Sols. 4 RFC 2663 - IP Network Address
Ltd. v. Juniper Translator (NAT)
Networks, No. C Terminology and
13 0616 JCS, Considerations
2013 WL RFC 3209 - RSVP - TE: Exten-
664425 (N.D. sions to RSVP for
Cal. Feb. 12, LSP Tunnels
2013). RFC 3386 - Network Hierarchy
and Multilayer Sur-
vivability
RLFC 4762 - Virtual Private LAN
Services over MPLS
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v. Spring Spec- transmission of IP
trum, L.P., No. datagrams over ser-
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CC (N.D. Ga. RFC 1945 - Hypertext Transfer
Mar. 31, 2014). Protocol --
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2014 Straight Path IP 4 RFC 791 - Internet Protocol,
Grp. v. Samsung RFC 793 - Transmission Control
(E.D. Tex. Protocol,
2014). RFC 1541 - Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol
2014 Ericsson Inc. v. 4 RFC 2341 - Cisco Layer Two
Intellectual Ven- Forwarding (Protocol) "L2F"
tures , LLC, No. RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
IPR2014-00527, ing Protocol "L2TP"
2014 WL RFC 827 - IP Encapsulating Se-
3885902 curity Payload (ESP)
(P.T.A.B. Aug. RFC 2784 - Generic Routing
6,F2014). Encapsulation (GRE)
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2015 Genband USA 4 RFC 792 - Internet Control Mes-
LLC v. sage Protocol
Metaswitch Net- RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
works Ltd., No. ing Protocol L2TP
2:14-CV-33- RFC 2543 - SIP: Session Initia-
JRG-RSP, 2015 tion Protocol
WL 1518007, at RFC 3261 - SIP: Session Initia-
*17-18, *30-31 tion Protocol
(E.D. Tex. Apr. RFC 5806 - Diversion Indication
1,2015). in SIP
RFC 3891 - The Session Initia-
tion Protocol (SIP)
"Replaces" Header
RFC 5359 - Session Initiation
Protocol Service Examples
2015 PTAB Inter 4 RFC 792 - Internet Control Mes-
partes review of sage Protocol
U.S. Patent No. RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
7,224,668 (Cis- ing Protocol L2TP
co).
2015 Arista Networks, 4 RFC 2401 - Security Architec-
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RFC 791 - Internet Protocol
RFC 1825 - Security Architec-
ture for the Internet
Protocol
RFC 1826 - IP Authentication
Header
RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating
Security Payload
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RFC 2401 - Security Architec-
ture for the Internet
Protocol
RFC 2402 - IP Authentication
Header
RFC 2403 - The Use of HMAC-
MD5-96 within ESP
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RFC 2405 - The ESP DES-CBC
Cipher Algorithm
With Explicit TV
RFC 2406 - IP Encapsulating
Security Payload
(ESP)
RFC 2407 - The Internet IP Se-
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terpretation for
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2015 Maxmind, Inc. v. 4 RFC 1122 - Requirements for
Fraud Control Internet Hosts:
Sys.com Corp., Communications
No. CBM2015- Layers
00094, 2015 WL RFC 1366 - Guidelines for Man-
5440812 agement of IP Ad-
(P.T.A.B. Sept. dress Space
11,2015). RFC 1531 -Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol

